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In this paper Hilbert’s paradox is for the firs time published completely. It was discovered by
David Hilbert while he was struggling with Cantor’s set theory. According to Hilbert, it initiated Ernst
Zermelo’s version of the Zermelo–Russell paradox. It is the paradox of all sets derived from addition
(union) and self-mapping. It is similar to Cantor’s paradox of the set of all cardinals, but, following
Hilbert, of “purely mathematical nature,” because an open reference to Cantor’s cardinal and ordinal
arithmetic is avoided. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
In diesem Aufsatz wird erstmals die Hilbertsche Antinomie vollsta¨ndig publiziert. David Hilbert
hat sie wa¨hrend seiner Auseinandersetzungen mit der Cantorschen Mengenlehre gefunden. Seinen
Angaben zufolge wurde Ernst Zermelo durch sie zu seiner Version der Zermelo–Russellschen Anti-
nomie angeregt. Es handelt sich um die Antinomie der Menge aller durch Addition (Vereinigung) und
Selbstbelegung erzeugbaren Mengen. Sie a¨hnelt der Cantorschen Antinomie der Menge aller Kardi-
nalzahlen, ist aber, soHilbert, “reinmathematisch,” da in ihr ein offensichtlicher Bezug zurCantorschen
Kardinal- und Ordinalzahlarithmetik vermieden wird. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1903 Gottlob Frege published the second volume of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
[Frege 1903] containing the admission that the logical system used there for the foundations
of arithmetic had proved to be inconsistent. He sent a copy of this volume to David Hilbert,
who thanked him in a letter dated 7 November 1903. In this letter Hilbert referred to Frege’s
description of Russell’s paradox in the postscript, and wrote that “this example” was already
known in Go¨ttingen. In a footnote he added “I believe Dr. Zermelo discovered it three or
four years ago after I had communicated my examples to him” and continued
I found other even more convincing contradictions as long as four or fi e years ago; they led me to
the conviction that traditional logic is inadequate and that the theory of concept formation needs to be
sharpened and refined 1
1 [Frege 1980, 51]. German original [Frege 1976, 79–80].
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Hence, Hilbert maintained that he had formulated logical paradoxes around 1898 or 1899
which he communicated to Zermelo, thereby initiating Zermelo’s independent discovery of
Russell’s paradox which took place around 1899 or 1900.
Zermelo’s part in this story is well known; Hilbert’s role, however, remains almost com-
pletely obscure. Hilbert never published a new paradox. There is no paradox associated
with Hilbert in standard catalogues of paradoxes. What could it be? What could be more
convincing than Russell’s paradox?
In this paperwe present a candidate forHilbert’s paradox. In the f rst partwe give evidence
for our suggestion and provide the historical context. In the second part Hilbert’s paradox
is described and its systematic signif cance is discussed.
Throughout the paper we use the term “paradox,” bearing in mind, however, that as early
as 1907 Ernst Zermelo had suggested using “antinomy” instead. After having read the proof
sheets of the paper “Bemerkungen zu den Paradoxieen von Russell und Burali-Forti” co-
authored by his student Kurt Grelling and his philosophical colleague in Go¨ttingen Leonard
Nelson [Grelling/Nelson 1908], he criticized in a comment to Nelson the use of the term
“paradox,” “antinomy” being much more precise. “Paradox” means, he wrote, “a statement
contradicting the common opinion; it doesn’t contain anything of an inner contradiction
(as is the case for the paradoxes of Russell and Burali-Forti, and expressed by the term
‘antinomy’).”2
2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
2.1. Zermelo’s Paradox
We turn toZermelo’s part in this story. Zermelo came toGo¨ttingen in 1897 in order towork
for his Habilitation. His special f elds of competence were the calculus of variations and
mathematical physics, such as thermodynamics and hydrodynamics.3 Under the inf uence
ofHilbert he changed his focus of interest to set theory and foundations.He becameHilbert’s
collaborator in the foundations of mathematics, a f rst member of Hilbert’s school before it
was even established. Zermelo’s f rst set-theoretical publication on the addition of transf nite
cardinals dates from 1902 [Zermelo 1902], but as early as the winter term 1900/1901 he
gave a lecture course on set theory in Go¨ttingen. It is possible that he found the paradox
while preparing this course. He referred to it in the famous polemical paper “ANew Proof of
the Possibility of a Well-Ordering” of 1908 [Zermelo 1908a]. There Zermelo noted that he
had found the paradox independently of Russell and that he had mentioned it to Hilbert and
other people already before 1903, the year when it was f rst published by Frege and Russell
[Frege 1903, Russell 1903]. And indeed, among the papers of Edmund Husserl, until 1916
professor of philosophy in Go¨ttingen, a note in Husserl’s hand was found, partially written
in Gabelsberger shorthand, saying that Zermelo had informed him on 16 April 1902 that the
2 Zermelo’s postcard to Leonard Nelson, Glion (Switzerland), no date (postmark 22 December 1907): “Wollen
Sie nicht auch lieber ‘Antinomie’ sagen, statt ‘Paradoxie,’ da der erstere Ausdruck sehr viel pra¨ziser ist.” A month
later Zermelo wrote to Nelson in a postcard, Glion, no date (postmark 20 January 1908): “Das Wort ‘Paradoxie’
scheint mir von Hessenberg [Gerhard Hessenberg, co-editor of the new series of theAbhandlungen der Fries’schen
Schule, where the joint paper was published] weil es eben etwas ganz anderes bedeutet, na¨mlich eine Aussage,
welche der herko¨mmlichen Meinung widerstreitet; von einem inneren Widerspruch entha¨lt es gar nichts,” Archiv
der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn, Nelson papers.
3 On Zermelo’s activities in Go¨ttingen cf. esp. [Moore 1982; Peckhaus 1990a, 76–122; Peckhaus 1990b].
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assumption of a set M that contains all of its subsetsm, m ′, . . . as elements, is an inconsistent
set, i.e., a set which, if treated as a set at all, leads to contradictions.4 Zermelo’s message
was a comment on a review that Husserl had written on the f rst volume of Ernst Schro¨der’s
Vorlesungen u¨ber die Algebra der Logik [Schro¨der 1890]. Schro¨der had criticized George
Boole’s interpretation of the symbol 1 as the class of everything that can be a subject of
discourse (the universe of discourse, universal class).5 Husserl had dismissed Schro¨der’s
argumentation as sophistical [Husserl 1891, 272], and was now advised by Zermelo that
Schro¨der was right concerning the matter, but not in his proof.
The document from the Husserl papers provides convincing evidence for Hilbert’s asser-
tion concerning Zermelo. It is furthermore conf rmed by Zermelo’s own recollections. In
1936, Heinrich Scholz was working on the papers of Gottlob Frege which he had acquired
for his department at the University of Mu¨nster. He had found Hilbert’s letter to Frege,
mentioned above, and now asked Zermelo what paradoxes Hilbert referred to in this letter.6
Zermelo answered that the set-theoretic paradoxes were often discussed in the Hilbert circle
around 1900, and he himself had given at that time a precise formulation of the paradox
which was later named after Russell.7
2.2. Traces of Hilbert’s Paradox
But what about Hilbert’s own paradox? It left some traces in history. The most prominent
one is Otto Blumenthal’s hint in his biography of Hilbert published in the third volume of
Hilbert’s Collected Works [Blumenthal 1935]. There Blumenthal mentions the paradoxes
of set theory and relates them to the second of Hilbert’s problems presented in the famous
Paris problems lecture in 1900 [Hilbert 1900a], i.e., the problem of proving the consistency
of the axioms of arithmetic. According to Blumenthal the paradoxes showed that certain
operations with the inf nite, which everyone thought to be allowed, led unquestionably to
contradictions. Blumenthal reports that Hilbert convinced himself of this fact by construct-
ing the example of an inconsistent set of all sets resulting from union and self-mapping,
i.e., purely mathematical operations [Blumenthal 1935, 421–422].
Another trace can be found in the year 1907. The Go¨ttingen philosopher Leonard Nelson
and the student of mathematics and philosophy Kurt Grelling were working on one of
the f rst philosophical papers to discuss the paradoxes, here especially the ones of Russell
and Burali-Forti [Grelling/Nelson 1908]. The joint paper contained a general formulation
4 Critical edition in Husserliana XXII [Husserl 1979, 399]: “Zermelo teilt mit (16. April 1902) [. . .] Eine
Menge M, welche jede ihrer Teilmengen m, m’ . . . als Element entha¨lt, ist eine inkonsistente Menge, d.h. eine
solche Menge, wenn sie u¨berhaupt als Menge behandelt wird, fu¨hrt zu Widerspru¨chen.” English translation in
[Rang/Thomas 1981].
5 [Schro¨der 1890, 245]: “Es [ist] in der That unzula¨ssig [. . .], unter 1 eine so umfassende, sozusagen ganz
offene Klasse, wie das oben geschilderte ‘Universum des Diskussionsfa¨higen’ (vonBoole) zu verstehen.” Schro¨der
referred to Boole’s def nition of the universe of discourse and his interpretation of the symbol 1; cf. [Boole 1854,
42–43].
6 Heinrich Scholz to Zermelo, dated Mu¨nster, 5 April 1936, University Archive Freiburg i. Br., Zermelo papers,
C 129/106.
7 Zermelo to Scholz, dated Freiburg i.,Br., 10 April 1936, Institut fu¨r mathematische Logik und Grundla-
genforschung, Mu¨nster, Scholz papers: “U¨ber die mengentheoretischen Antinomien wurde um 1900 herum im
Hilbert’schen Kreise viel diskutiert, und damals habe ich auch der Antinomie von der gro¨ßten Ma¨chtigkeit die
spa¨ter nachRussell benannte pra¨zise Form (von der ‘Menge allerMengen, die sich nicht selbst enthalten’) gegeben.
Beim Erscheinen des Russellschen Werkes [. . .] war uns das schon gela¨uf g.”
160 PECKHAUS AND KAHLE HMAT 29
suitable for several paradoxes, among them the semantical “heterological paradox” or
“Grelling’s paradox” (cf. [Peckhaus 1990a, 168–195; Peckhaus 1995]). From a letter
of the Go¨ttingen mathematician Ernst Hellinger to Leonard Nelson, dated 28 December
1907,8 we learn that Hellinger had read a manuscript version of the paper. He suggested
adding a note on Hilbert’s paradox, because its appearance was more mathematical and
perhaps more suitable for mathematicians not working in set theory. In the end Hilbert’s
paradox was not included, because Grelling failed to reduce it to the general formulation.
Nevertheless we can state that, at least in Go¨ttingen, Hilbert’s paradox was generally known
in that time.
2.3. Hilbert and Cantor
Given the time period referred to by Hilbert, it can be assumed that Hilbert formulated
the paradox during his discussions with Georg Cantor, documented in their correspondence
between 1897 and 1900.9 The main topics were Cantor’s problems with the assumption of
a set of all cardinals. Already in the f rst of Cantor’s letters to Hilbert, dated 26 September
1897 [Cantor 1991, No. 156, 388–389], Cantor proved that the totality of alephs does not
exist, i.e., that this totality is not a well-def ned, f nished set [fertige Menge]. If it were taken
to be a f nished set, a certain larger aleph would follow on this totality. So this new aleph
would at the same time belong to the totality of all alephs, and not belong to it, because of
being larger than all alephs (ibid., 388). Cantor consequently distinguished sets from other
kinds of multiplicities, i.e., “f nished” sets frommultiplicities which are not sets, such as the
totality of all cardinals. The latter multiplicities are “absolutely inf nite,” unlike the former
ones, the “transf nite” sets. In a later letter Cantor gave the following characterization of a
f nished set: A set can be imagined as f nished if it is consistently possible to imagine all of
its elements as being gathered, the set itself therefore as one compound thing, i.e., if it is
possible to imagine the totality of its elements as existing.10 This is, however, impossible
for the absolute inf nite which he identif es with God. The absolute infinite does not allow
any determination [Cantor 1883, 556]. Realized in its highest perfection in God it has
to be strictly opposed to the actual infinite which he calls the transf nite [Cantor 1887,
81–82].
It is well known that Cantor later changed his terminology. In May 1899 he wrote to
Hilbert that he had become accustomed to replace what he formerly had called “f nished”
by the expression “consistent.” The notion “sets” stood now for “consistentmultiplicities.”11
Cantor disproves the existence of the totality of all cardinals by showing that the as-
sumption of its existence contradicts his def nition of a set as a comprehension of certain
8 Hellinger to Nelson, dated Breslau, 28 December 1907, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn, Nelson
papers: “Eswa¨re vielleicht nicht unzweckma¨ßig, es [Hilbert’s paradox] zu erwa¨hnen, da esmathematischer aussieht
als die andern, und vielleicht auch dem nicht-mengentheoretischen Mathematiker sympathischer aussieht, als das
W-Paradoxon [i.e., Burali-Forti’s paradox of the set W of all ordinals].”
9 For a comprehensive discussion of this correspondence cf. [Purkert/Ilgauds 1987, 147–166]. Extracts are
published in [Cantor 1991]. For Cantor’s reaction to the paradox see also [Ferreiro´s 1999, 290–296].
10 Cantor’s letter to Hilbert, dated 2 October 1897 [Cantor 1991, 390], also published in [Purkert/Ilgauds 1987,
No. 44, 226–227]. A similar def nition can be found in Cantor’s letter to Hilbert, Halle, 10 October 1898 [Cantor
1991, No. 158, 396–397, def nition on 396].
11 Cantor’s letter to Hilbert, Halle, 9 May 1899 [Cantor 1991, No. 160, 399].
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well-distinguished objects of our intuition or our thinking in a whole.12 The totality of
all cardinals (and of all ordinals) cannot be thought of as one such thing, contrary to
actual inf nite objects such as transf nite sets. He is therefore not really concerned with
paradoxes and their solution, but with nonexistence proofs using reductio ad absurdum
arguments.13
From these passages we learn that Hilbert was concerned with what was later called
“Cantor’s paradox,” i.e., the paradox of the greatest cardinal, or of the set of all cardinals.
It is clear, however, that the contradiction discussed by Cantor served only as a paradig-
matic example for other inconsistent multiplicities, i.e., totalities resulting from unrestricted
comprehension. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Cantor and Hilbert discussed the
contradiction resulting from the assumption of a greatest ordinal, today known as “Burali-
Forti’s paradox,” although this has been claimed by several authors.14 Usually Cantor’s
letter to Philip E. B. Jourdain of 4 November 1903 is taken as evidence that Cantor had
known the paradox of the greatest ordinal before its publication by Cesare Burali-Forti
[Burali-Forti 1897], and that he had communicated this paradox to Hilbert as early as
1896.15 In fact Cantor showed in this letter to Jourdain that the assumption of a system of
all ordinals leads to a contradiction. In his communication with Hilbert of 9 May 1899,
however, he only referred to the assumption of a greatest cardinal.16 Purkert and Ilgauds
made it furthermore plausible [Purkert/Ilgauds 1987, 151] that Cantor’s recollections were
erroneous. He most probably referred to his letter to Hilbert of 26 September 1897, men-
tioned above. The notion of the greatest ordinal was also the topic of a letter Cantor wrote
to Dedekind on 3 August 1899. There he proved that the system  of all numbers is an in-
consistent, absolutely inf nite multiplicity.17 In this letter Cantor also referred to the totality
of everything imaginable (“Inbegriff alles Denkbaren”), i.e., Dedekind’s own assumption
in Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? [Dedekind 1888], needed to prove that there are
inf nite systems (sets).18 Cantor showed that his nonexistence proofs also hold with this
assumption.
12 [Cantor 1895/97], quoted in [Cantor 1932, 282]: “Unter einer ‘Menge’ verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung
M von bestimmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten m unsrer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens (welche die
‘Elemente’ von M genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen.”
13 We follow in this evaluation [Moore/Garciadiego 1981], [Garciadiego Dantan 1992].
14 E.g., [Fraenkel 1930, 261; Meschkowski 1983, 144].
15 The letter was quoted by Jourdain [Jourdain 1904] and mentioned by Felix Bernstein [Bernstein 1905, 187].
Gerhard Hessenberg referred to Bernstein when maintaining Cantor’s priority [Hessenberg 1906, Sect. 98, 631].
From there it became standard folklore. Cf. [Grattan-Guinness 2000, 117–119].
16 Cantor’s letter to Philip E. B. Jourdain, dated Halle 4 November 1903 [Cantor 1991, No. 172, 433–434, quote
433]: “Den unzweifelhaft richtigen Satz, daß es außer den Alephs keine anderen transf niten Cardinalzahlen giebt,
habe ich vor u¨ber 20 Jahren (bei der Entdeckung der Alephs selbst) intuitiv erkannt. [. . .] Schon vor 7 Jahren
machte ich Herrn Hilbert, vor 4 Jahren Herrn Dedekind darauf bezu¨gliche briefliche Mitteilung.” The extensive
correspondence between Cantor and Jourdain is published in [Grattan-Guinness 1972–1973].
17 Cantor to Dedekind, dated Halle, 3 August 1899, [Cantor 1991, No. 163, 407–411]. It is one of the best
known of Cantor’s letters, published already in Zermelo’s edition of Cantor’s collected works [Cantor 1932,
443–447]. Ivor Grattan-Guinness has shown, however, that Zermelo combined this letter with the one of 28 July
1899 and even changed the original wording at some places [Grattan-Guinness 1974–1975]. The correct text of
the letter of 28 July 1899 is found in [Cantor 1991, No. 162, 405].
18 [Dedekind 1888, 14]: “Meine Gedankenwelt, d. h. die Gesamtheit S aller Dinge, welche Gegenstand meines
Denkens sein ko¨nnen, ist unendlich.”
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Hilbert’s responses in correspondence have not been preserved,19 but he published his
opinion in prominent places. In the paper “On the Concept of Number” from 1900 [Hilbert
1900b], Hilbert’s f rst paper on the foundations of arithmetic, he gave a set of axioms for
arithmetic and claimed that only a suitable modif cation of known methods of inference
would be needed to prove the consistency of the axioms. If this proof were successful, the
existence of the totality of real numbers would be shown at the same time. In this context
he referred to Cantor’s problem of whether the system of real numbers is a consistent, or
f nished, set. He stressed:
Under the conception above, the doubts which have been raised against the existence of the totality of all
real numbers (and against the existence of inf nite sets in general) lose all justif cation; for by the set of
real numbers we do not have to imagine the totality of all possible laws according to which the elements
of a fundamental sequence can proceed, but rather—as just described—a system of things whose internal
relations are given by a finite and closed set of axioms [. . .], and about which new statements are valid
only if one can derive them from the axioms by means of a f nite number of logical inferences.20
He also claimed that the existence of the totality of all powers or of all Cantorian alephs could
be disproved, i.e., in Cantor’s terminology, that the system of all powers is an inconsistent
(not f nished) set (ibid.).
Hilbert took up this topic again in his famous Paris lecture on “Mathematical Problems.”21
In the context of his commentary on the second problem concerning the consistency of the
arithmetical axioms he used the same examples fromCantorian set theory and the continuum
problem as in the earlier lecture. “If contradictory attributes be assigned to a concept,” he
wrote, “I say, that mathematically the concept does not exist” [Hilbert 1996a, 1105].
According to Hilbert a suitable axiomatization would be able to avoid the contradic-
tions resulting from the attempt to comprehend absolute inf nite multiplicities as units,
because only those concepts had to be accepted which could be derived from an axiomatic
base.
2.4. The 1905 Lecture
Although it is evident that Hilbert was at that time deeply concerned with the problems
of set theory, we have found no direct evidence that Hilbert had formulated contradictions
in this context, or even a paradox of his own. Indirect evidence can be found, however, in
documents dating from a few years later.
Only after the publication of the paradoxes by Russell and Frege, and especially through
Frege’s reaction, did the logical signif cance of this kind of contradiction become evident.22
Now mathematicians understood that these paradoxes were not the simple contradictions
that they were familiar with in their everyday reductio ad absurdum arguments. As logical
paradoxes they seriously affected Hilbert’s axiomatic programme, especially the proposed
consistency proof for arithmetic. It is a matter of course that a consistency proof, based on a
logic proved to be inconsistent, could not be given. Hilbert f rst expressed this new insight
in a talk delivered at the Third International Congress of Mathematicians in Heidelberg in
19 In his letter to Hilbert of 2 October 1897 Cantor referred to some of Hilbert’s objections, quoted in [Purkert/
Ilgauds 1987, 226–227].
20 [Hilbert 1996b, 1095]. German original [Hilbert 1900b, 184].
21 [Hilbert 1900a]; English translations [Hilbert 1902; Hilbert 1996a].
22 Cf. [Moore 1978; Moore 1980, 104–105; Moore/Garciadiego 1981; Garciadiego Dantan 1992].
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August 1904 [Hilbert 1905c]. In this lecture “On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic”
he demanded a “partly simultaneous development of the laws of logic and arithmetic”
[Hilbert 1905c, 176]. According to Blumenthal [Blumenthal 1935, 422], this lecture re-
mained completely misunderstood and several of Hilbert’s ideas proved to be defective.
Nevertheless it was the f rst step in the construction of a foundational system of mathemat-
ics avoiding the paradoxes.
The next step was taken in a lecture course on the “Logical Principles of Mathematical
Thinking” which Hilbert gave in Go¨ttingen in the summer term of 1905. Two sets of notes
of this lecture course were preserved. The “off cial” notes are from Ernst Hellinger, then
a student of mathematics. They contain marginal notes in Hilbert’s hand [Hilbert 1905a].
Another set was produced by the student of mathematics and physics Max Born [Hilbert
1905b]. Part B of these notes, on “The Logical Foundations,” starts with a comprehensive
discussion of the paradoxes of set theory. It begins with metaphorical considerations on the
general development of science:
It was, indeed, usual practice in the historical development of science that we began cultivating a
discipline without many scruples, pressing onwards as far as possible, that we thereby, however, then
ran into diff culties (often only after a long time) that forced us to turn back and ref ect on the foundations
of the discipline. The house of knowledge is not erected like a dwelling where the foundation is f rst
well laid-out before the erection of the living quarters begins. Science prefers to obtain comfortable
rooms as quickly as possible in which it can rule, and only subsequently, when it becomes clear that,
here and there, the loosely joined foundations are unable to support the completion of the rooms, science
proceeds in propping up and securing them. This is no shortcoming but rather a correct and healthy
development.23
Although contradictions are quite common in science, Hilbert continued, in the case of
set theory they seem to be different, because there they have a tendency toward the side
of theoretical philosophy. In set theory the common Aristotelian logic and its standard
methods of concept formation were used without hesitation. And these standard tools of
purely logical operations, especially the subsumption of concepts under a general concept,
proved to be responsible for the new contradictions.
Hilbert elucidated these considerations by presenting three examples. The f rst paradox
discussed is the Liar paradox. The third one is “Zermelo’s paradox,” as the Russell–Zermelo
paradoxwas called inGo¨ttingen at that time.Hilbert described this paradox as purely logical,
assuming that it might be more convincing for nonmathematicians. He stressed, however,
that it was derived from his own paradox, the second one in his list of examples, and
this second paradox was, according to Hilbert, of purely mathematical nature.24 Hilbert
expressed his opinion that this paradox
appears to be especially important; when I found it, I thought in the beginning that it causes invincible
problems for set theory that would f nally lead to the latter’s eventual failure; now I f rmly believe,
however, that everything essential can be kept after a revision of the foundations, as always in science up
to now. I have not published this contradiction, but it is known to set theorists, especially to G. Cantor.25
This paradox, arising from uniting sets and mapping them to themselves, is exactly the one
23 [Hilbert 1905b, 122], published in [Peckhaus 1990, 51].
24 [Hilbert 1905a, 210]: “Als drittes Beispiel dieser Widerspru¨che stelle ich neben diesen meinen rein mathe-
matischen noch einen rein logischen, den Dr. Zermelo aus jenem herausgezogen hat [. . .].”
25 [Hilbert 1905a, 204], published in [Peckhaus 1990, 52].
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Blumenthal referred to in his biography. It is most likely the one Hilbert himself referred
to in his letter to Frege.
3. HILBERT’S PARADOX
3.1. Hilbert’s Presentation
The full text of Hilbert’s paradox is given in the appendixes, both in English translation
(Appendix I) and in the German original (Appendix II). Here, we reconstruct the main steps
of Hilbert’s argument.
The paradox is based on a special notion of set which Hilbert introduces by means of
two set formation principles starting from the natural numbers. The f rst principle is the
addition principle. In analogy to the f nite case, Hilbert argued that the principle can be
used for uniting two sets together “into a new conceptual unit [. . .], a new set that contains
each element of either sets.” This operation can be extended: “In the same way, we are able
to unite several sets and even inf nitely many into a union.” The second principle is called
the mapping principle. Given a setM, he introduces the setMM of self-mappings ofM to
itself.26 A self-mapping is just a total function which maps the elements ofM to elements
ofM.27
Now, he considers all sets which result from the natural numbers “by applying the oper-
ations of addition and self-mapping an arbitrary number of times.” By use of the addition
principle which makes it possible to build the union of arbitrary sets one can “unite them
all into a sum set U which is well-def ned.” In the next step the mapping principle is applied
to U , and we get F = UU as the set of all self-mappings of U . Since F was built from
the natural numbers by using the two principles only, Hilbert concludes that it has to be
contained in U . From this fact he derives a contradiction.
Since “there are ‘not more’ elements” in F than in U there is an assignment of the
elements ui of U to elements fi of F such that all elements of fi are used. Now one can
def ne a self-mapping g of U which differs from all fi . Thus, g is not contained in F . Since
F was assumed to contain all self-mappings we have a contradiction. In order to def ne
g Hilbert used Cantor’s diagonalization method. If fi is a mapping ui to fi (ui )= u f (i)i he
chooses an elementug(i) different fromu f (i)i as the imageofui under g. Thus,wehave g(ui ) =
ug(i) = u f (i)i and g “is distinct from any mapping fk of F in at least one assignment.”28
Hilbert f nishes his argument with the following observation:
We could also formulate this contradiction so that, according to the last consideration, the set UU is
always bigger [of greater cardinality]29 than U but, according to the former, is an element of U .
26 Hilbert used the German term “Selbstbelegung” which is translated here by “self-mapping.” The term “Bele-
gung” was already used by Cantor [Cantor 1895/97, Sect. 4, 486 (1895)]; cf. also [Cantor 1932, 287]. In his edition
of Georg Cantor’s collected works Zermelo explained Belegung as a function with explicitly given domain and
(potential) range [Cantor 1932, footnote [3], 352].
27 In classical logic,MM is isomorphic to 2M, and the set of all mappings fromM to {0, 1} is isomorphic to
P(M), the power set ofM.
28 Hilbert’s notation ug(i) is somewhat clumsy. In fact, it is enough to say that g(ui ) = vi for an element vi of
U with vi = fi (ui ).
29 Remark later added in Hilbert’s hand in Hellinger’s lecture notes.
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3.2. Brief Reconstruction
In order to make the argument more comprehensible, the paradox can be presented in the
following way. First we def ne a notion of set:
DEFINITION 1. We def ne inductively:
1. The natural numbers as a whole are a set.30
2. Addition principle: If we have an arbitrary, possibly inf nite collection of sets, the
union of all these sets is a set.
3. Mapping principle: The totality of all total functions from a given set into itself is
a set.
Now we take the closure of all sets introduced according to the following def nition (this
union is well def ned according to the addition principle):
DEFINITION 2. Let U be the union of all sets def ned according to def nition 1.
Now we can apply the mapping principle to it.
DEFINITION 3. Let F be the set UU .
Obviously F is built according to our def nition of sets. We have used the addition
principle to def ne U and then the mapping principle to def neF . But this means thatF has
to be contained in U because U was the union of all sets built according to the def nition of
sets. Thus, we get
LEMMA 4. F ⊆ U .
From this lemma it follows that there exists a function of U in F whose range is the
whole set F . Therefore, we can apply Cantor’s diagonalization method to def ne a function
from U to U which is distinct from each element of F .
PROPOSITION 5. There exists a total function g from U to U such that g ∈ F .
But by def nition of F , this set contains all total functions from U to U . Thus, we get
COROLLARY 6. The system of sets defined by 1 is contradictory.
3.3. Analysis of the Paradox
The reconstruction given above reveals the source of the paradox. Obviously the addition
principle is too vague. Hilbert allows “to unite several sets and even inf nitely many into
a union,” he even allows to “unite them all,” i.e., all sets def ned by addition and self-
mapping. He does not determine, however, the domain of the universal quantif er. The
def nition of the set U is, thus, based on an impredicative construction, because U itself
has to belong to this domain. In short: The def nition of U depends on a totality containing
U itself.
These problems can be overcome by restricting the addition principle. It has to be de-
manded that the sets united have to be elements of another set already established. And this
30 Hilbert even argues that the natural numbers can be def ned from f nite sets using the addition principle.
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is, in fact, the way in which Zermelo proceeded in his axiomatization of set theory. This
axiomatic system, ref ned by Fraenkel and Skolem and called ZFC, is still today generally
accepted as the basis of mathematics. In ZFC we have a union axiom corresponding to the
addition principle. But in contrast to the addition principle, a family of sets T being itself a
set is demanded, which can be regarded as an index set giving some control over the sets
gathered in the union [Zermelo 1908b, 265]. Nowadays, the union axiom is stated as
∀T ∃S∀x(x ∈ S ↔ ∃U (x ∈ U ∧ U ∈ T )).
Fraenkel correctly saw that an unrestricted union axiom within axiomatized set theory led
to the same problems as the ones connected with Russell’s paradox. He saw the reason for
these problems in an unconcerned use of the notion “arbitrarily many.” Fraenkel referred
directly to the union axiom, so his analysis reads like a diagnosis of the cause of Hilbert’s
paradox.31
Although Hilbert worked only in a restricted domain of sets, containing only those sets
formed by addition and self-mapping, his addition principle was itself too vague, so that it
resulted in effects similar to those of Cantor’s comprehension.32 From another perspective
the lack of a proper quantif cation theory is conspicuous. Hilbert’s formulation is therefore
affected by the general problems of impredicativity.
Zermelo’s axiomatization of set theory can thus be read as an answer to two differ-
ent paradoxes. His strategy was to avoid unrestricted comprehension, leading to Cantor’s
paradox (and also to the Zermelo–Russell paradox), and unrestricted union, leading to
Hilbert’s paradox. He easily prevented the formulation of Hilbert’s paradox by introducing
the family set T in the union axiom (axiom V). The paradoxes resulting from unrestricted
comprehension were avoided by introducing the separation axiom (axiom III), which en-
sures that each set M has at least one subset M0 not being an element of M [Zermelo
1908b, 264].
In contrast to the addition principle, themapping principle is “innocent” of the emergence
of Hilbert’s paradox. If we replace the total functions fromM toM by total functions from
M to the set {0, 1} we get the set of characteristic functions of all subsets ofM. Thus, the
mapping principle is closely related to the power set axiom as it is used inmodern set theory.
31 [Fraenkel 1927, 71]: “Will man [. . .] zu etwas allgemeineren Prozessen [of set formation] fortschreiten, so
muß man [. . .] auch die Zusammenfassung der Elemente verschiedener Mengen anstreben. Einen Fingerzeig, wie
dies zu erfolgen hat, liefert uns die Bildung der Vereinigungsmenge in der CANTORschen Mengenlehre, wo die
sa¨mtlichen Elemente beliebig vieler Mengen zu einer neuen Menge, der Vereinigungsmenge, vereinigt werden
ko¨nnen [. . .]. Hinsichtlich der gefahrdrohenden Folgen eines unbeku¨mmerten Gebrauchs des Begriffs ‘beliebig
viele’ sind wir freilich, z. B. durch das RUSSELLsche Paradoxon, hinla¨nglich gewitzigt; wir gehen daher nicht wie
fru¨her von beliebig vielen Mengen aus, sondern setzen voraus, daß diese Mengen als die Elemente einer bereits
als legitim erkannten Menge sa¨uberlich gegeben sind.”
32 This is also the conclusion of Paul Bernays who reported in 1971, obviously referring to Hilbert’s para-
dox: “Der Gedanke der Beschra¨nkung auf solche Mengen, die man, beginnend mit einer Ausgangsmenge (etwa
der Menge der natu¨rlichen Zahlen) durch Potenzmengenbildungen, Vereinigungsprozesse und Aussonderungen
bilden kann, wurde—wie ich aus Erza¨hlungen von Hilbert weiß—seinerzeit auch erwogen; er fu¨hrte aber zuna¨chst
gerade zu einer Verscha¨rfung der Paradoxien, daman dieVereinigungsprozesse nicht genu¨gend deutlich normierte,
vielmehr die Zusammenfassung der durch die angegebenen Prozesse gewinnbaren Mengen zu einer Menge
ihrerseits als einen zula¨ssigen Vereinigungsprozeß ansah” [Bernays 1971/1976, 199]. We would like to thank
Jose´ F. Ruiz, Madrid, for bringing this quote to our attention.
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Hilbert demanded for the mapping principle that the set of all self-mappings is obtained
over sets already established, a restriction also valid for the modern power set axiom.
4. CONCLUSION
Hilbert’s paradox is closely related to Cantor’s own paradox. Both Cantor and Hilbert
construct “sets” which lead to contradictions being proved with the help of Cantor’s
diagonalization argument. However, the ways in which these “sets” are constructed dif-
fer essentially. According to Cantor ([Cantor 1883, sect. 11], cf. [Cantor 1932, 195–197]),
there are three principles for the generation of cardinals. The f rst principle (“erstes
Erzeugungsprinzip”) concerns the generation of real whole numbers [reale ganze Zahlen,
i.e., ordinal numbers] by adding a unit to a given, already generated number. The second
principle allows the formation of a new number, if a certain succession of whole numbers
with no greatest number is given. This new number is imagined as the limit of this succes-
sion. Cantor adds a third principle, the inhibition or restriction principle (“Hemmungs- oder
Beschra¨nkungsprinzip”) which grants that the second number class has not only a higher
cardinality than the f rst number class, but exactly the next higher cardinality. Consider-
ing Cantor’s general def nition of a set as the comprehension of certain well-distinguished
objects of our intuition or our thinking as a whole [Cantor 1895/97; Cantor 1932, 282],
one can justly ask whether the sets of all cardinals, of all ordinals or the universal set of
all sets are sets according to this def nition, i.e., whether an unrestricted comprehension is
possible. Cantor denies this, justifying his opinion with the help of a reductio ad absurdum
argument, but he does not exclude the possibility of forming the paradoxes by provisions
in his formalism.
Hilbert, on the other hand, introduces two alternative set formation principles, the addi-
tion principle and the mapping principle, but they lead to paradoxes as well. In avoiding
concepts from transf nite arithmetic Hilbert believes that the purely mathematical nature
of his paradox is guaranteed. For him, this paradox appears to be much more serious for
mathematics than Cantor’s, because it concerns an operation that is part of everyday practice
of working mathematicians.
The signif cance of Hilbert’s paradox for the history of mathematics should now be ob-
vious. The paradox shows the importance of the discussion at the end of the 19th century
on universal sets and classes, e.g., Cantor’s absolutely inf nite totalities, Dedekind’s inf nite
totality of all things which might become objects of our thinking, and Boole’s universe of
discourse. From the beginning the limitation of size argument played a role (cf. [Hallett
1984]). This discussion marked a latent foundational crisis in mathematics. The mathe-
maticians involved were dealing with paradoxes, i.e., contradictions that are, they believed,
avoidable. The foundational crisis became manifest in 1903, when Bertrand Russell and
Gottlob Frege published the insight that “Russell’s paradox” could be derived from Frege’s
system of theGrundgesetze. Nowmathematicians were dealing with antinomies, i.e., intrin-
sic contradictions that could not easily be solved. Even this newmovewas closely connected
to the earlier discussion because Russell found his own paradoxwhile investigating Cantor’s
set theory (cf. [Garciadiego Dantan 1992; Grattan-Guinness 1978; Grattan-Guinness 2000,
310–315; Moore 1980, 104–105]). Hilbert himself had to change his axiomatic programm.
Now logic and set theory moved into the focus of his foundational research (cf. [Peckhaus
1990, 61–75]).
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APPENDIX I. HILBERT’S PARADOX
English Translation
[Marginal note: 18th lecture, 10 July] [. . .] |204 In addition, I now come to two examples
of contradictions which are much more convincing. The f rst, being of purely mathematical
nature, appears to be especially important; when I found it, I thought in the beginning that
it causes invincible problems for set theory that would lead to the latter’s eventual failure;
now I f rmly believe, however, that everything essential can be kept after a revision of the
foundations, as always in science up to now. I have not published this contradiction, but it is
known to set theorists, especially to G. Cantor. Anyhow, we regard f nite sets, represented
by f nitely many numbers, as the operational basis permitted, and also the countable inf nite
set 1, 2, 3, . . . of all natural numbers. Furthermore, it seems to be allowed to unite two such
sets (1, 2, 3, . . .) and (a1, a2, a3, . . .) into a new conceptual unit (1, 2, 3, . . . , a1, a2, a3, . . .),
i.e., a new set that contains each element of either set. In the same way, we are able to unite
several sets and even inf nitelymany into a union.Wedesignate this as theaddition principle,
and write |205 in brief for the set obtained fromM1,M2 . . . ,
M1 +M2 + · · · .
These unions are operations, generally applied in logic in even much more complicated
cases without any hesitation. Therefore, it seems to be possible to apply them here without
further ado. Besides this addition principle, we use a further consideration for forming new
sets. Let y = f (x) be a number theoretic function which maps to every integer value x an
integer y; in a sense immediately to be understood, we can designate such a function as a
mapping [Belegung] of the number sequence to itself, by imagining for instance a scheme
x = 1, 2, 3, 4 . . .
y = 2, 3, 6, 9 . . . .
The system of all these number theoretic functions f (x), or of all possible mappings of
the number sequence to its own elements, forms a new set “resulting from the number
sequenceM by self-mapping;” we write itMM. |206 As a principle following from the
laws of uniting in ordinary logic and, according to it, completely unobjectionable, we can
now regard the opinion that in every case well-def ned sets arise from well-def ned sets by
the self-mapping operation (mapping principle). For instance, by using this principle, from
the continuum of all real numbers results the set of all real functions. We want to use only
these two principles unobjectionable according to all previous mathematics and logic.
We start with all f nite sets of numbers and the inf nite series 1, 2, 3, . . . of natural numbers
already derived therefrom by addition, and take all sets resulting from them by applying the
operations of addition and self-mapping an arbitrary number of times; these sets form again
a well-def ned unit, for according to the addition principle I unite them all into a sum set U
which is well def ned. If I form now the set F = UU of self-mappings of U , this set arises
from the original number sequence via the two operations of addition and |207 self-mapping
only; it, therefore, also is one of the sets from whose addition U just resulted and, therefore,
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must be a subset of U :
(1) F is contained in U .
[Marginal note: 19th lecture, 11 July] I will now show that this leads to a contradiction. Let
u1, u2, u3, . . . be the elements of U ; then, each element f of F =UU represents a mapping
of U to itself, i.e., in a way a function, that assigns to each element ui of U another u f (i) ,
where it is not at all necessary that the u f (i) have to be distinct from one another; we,
therefore, represent this element f most conveniently in schematic form:
f (u1) = u f (1) , f (u2) = u f (2) , f (u3) = u f (3) , . . . .
Our result (1), thatF is contained in U , can now be expressed more exactly in the following
way: we can def nitely assign to each single element ui of U an fi of F so that all fi will
thereby be used, maybe even repeatedly, but that, in any case, to each ui only corresponds
exactly one fi ; this means, obviously, nothing else than that there are “not more” elements
fi than ui . We now consider such an assignment, |208
u1| f1, u2| f2, u3| f3, . . . ,
and from this I will form a new mapping g of U to itself that differs from all fi ; i.e., it is
not an element of F because, in our assignment, all elements of F had to be used up; but
since F includes all possible mappings, we have, thus, derived the contradiction. We again
apply the principle of Cantor’s diagonalization method. In the mapping f1, let the element
u1 correspond to the u f (1)1 :
f1(u1) = u f (1)1 ;
if ug(1) is an element different from u f (1)1 , then we construct the newmapping g which assigns
u1 to it:
g(u1) = ug(1) = u f (1)1 .
We proceed further according to this principle; by the way, the designation of elements
of U and F by number indices is not essential, and it should by no means insinuate that
these sets are countable, which is not at all the case. If u2 is some element of U , a mapping
[Belegung] f2 |209 belongs to it in the mapping [Abbildung] of f to u; we look for the
element f2(u2) = u f (2)2 , which it [the mapping f2] assigns to u2, choose ug(2) = u f (2)2 , and
def ne a mapping g which assigns it to u2:
g(u2) = ug(2) = u f (2)2 .
The mapping g which we obtain in this way has the scheme
g(u1) = ug(1) = u f (1)1 , g(u2) = ug(2) = u f (2)2 , g(u3) = ug(3) = u f (3)3 . . . .
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It is distinct from any mapping fk of F in at least one assignment; namely, if uk is the
element (or one of these) corresponding to fk in the mapping [Abbildung] of F to U , then
it follows from the def nition of g that
fk(uk) = u f (k)k g(uk) = ug(k) = u f (k)k .
By this, we indeed have the contradiction that the well-def ned mapping g cannot be a
member of the set of all mappings. We could also formulate this contradiction so that,
according to the last consideration, the set UU is always bigger [note in Hilbert’s hand:
“of greater cardinality”] than U but, according to the former, is an element of U . This
contradiction is not at all yet solved; anyway, one can see that it must depend upon the
fact that the operations of uniting arbitrary sets or objects into |210 new sets or totalities,
respectively, is, nevertheless, not allowed, although it is always used in traditional logic,
and although we have carefully applied it only to natural numbers and sets arising from
them, i.e., to purely mathematical objects.
APPENDIX II. HILBERT’S PARADOX
German Original
[Marginalie: 18. Vorles. 10. VII.] [. . .] |204 Ich komme nun noch zu 2 Beispielen fu¨r
Widerspru¨che, die viel u¨berzeugender sind, der erste, der rein mathematischer Natur
ist, scheint mir besonders bedeutsam; als ich ihn fand, glaubte ich zuerst, daß er der
Mengentheorie unu¨berwindliche Schwierigkeiten in den Weg legte, an denen sie scheitern
mu¨ßte; ich glaube jedoch jetzt sicher, daß wie stets bisher in der Wissenschaft, nach der Re-
vision derGrundlagen allesWesentliche erhalten bleibenwird. Ich habe diesenWiderspruch
nicht publiciert; er ist aber den Mengentheoretikern, insbesondere G. Cantor, bekannt. Wir
sehen die endlichenMengen, durch endlich viele Zahlen repra¨sentiert, jedenfalls als erlaubte
Operationsbasis an, und ebensodie abza¨hlbar unendlicheMenge1, 2, 3, . . . aller natu¨rlichen
Zahlen. Ferner erscheint es erlaubt, 2 solcheMengen (1, 2, 3 . . .) und (a1, a2, a3 . . .) zu einer
neuen Begriffseinheit (1, 2, 3 . . . , a1, a2, a3 . . .), einer neuen Menge, zusammenzufassen,
die jedes Element der beiden Mengen entha¨lt. Ebenso ko¨nnen wir auch mehrere Mengen
und sogar unendlich viele zu einer Vereinigungsmenge zusammenfassen. Wir bezeichnen
das als Additionsprincip, und schreiben |205 die so aus M1,M2 . . . hervorgehende
Menge kurz
M1 +M2 + · · ·
Diese Zusammenfassungen sind Processe, die man in der Logik stets ohne jedes Bedenken
in noch weit komplicierteren Fa¨llen anwendet; es scheint also, daß man auch hier ohne
weiteres davon Gebrauch machen ko¨nnte. Außer diesem Additionsprincip verwenden wir
noch eine weitere Betrachtung zur Bildung neuer Mengen. Es sei y = f (x) eine zahlen-
theoretische Funktion, die zu jedem ganzzahligen Wert x ein ganzzahliges y zuordnet; in
sofort zu verstehendem Sinne ko¨nnen wir eine solche Funktion auch als eine Belegung der
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Zahlenreihe mit sich selbst bezeichnen, indem wir etwa an ein Schema denken:
x = 1, 2, 3, 4 . . .
y = 2, 3, 6, 9 . . .
Das System aller solcher zahlentheoretischen Funktionen f (x) oder aller mo¨glichen
Belegungen der Zahlenreihe mit Elementen ihrer selbst bildet eine neue Menge, die “durch
Selbstbelegung aus der ZahlenreiheM entstehende,” wir schreiben sieMM. Als aus den
|206 Zusammenfassungsgesetzen der u¨blichen Logik folgendes und nach ihr ga¨nzlich unbe-
denkliches Princip ko¨nnen wir nun das ansehen, daß aus wohldef nierten Mengen durch
Selbstbelegung immerwiederwohldef nierteMengen entstehen. (Belegungsprincip). Durch
dies Princip entsteht aus demContinuum aller reellen Zahlen beispielsweise dieMenge aller
reellen Funktionen. Allein mit diesen beiden nach aller bisherigen Mathematik und Logik
unbedenklichen Principen wollen wir arbeiten.
Wir gehen von allen endlichen Mengen von Zahlen und der aus ihnen bereits durch
Addition entstehenden unendlichen Reihe 1, 2, 3 . . . der natu¨rlichen Zahlen aus, und fassen
alle Mengen auf, die aus ihnen durch die beiden beliebig oft anzuwendenden Processe der
Addition und Selbstbelegung entstehen; diese Mengen bilden wieder eine wohldef nierte
Gesammtheit, nach dem Additionsprincip vereinige ich sie alle zu einer Summenmenge U ,
die wohldef niert ist. Bilde ich nun die Menge F = UU der Selbstbelegungen von U , so
entsteht diese auch aus der urspru¨nglichen Zahlenreihe lediglich durch die beiden Processe
der Addition und |207 Selbstbelegung; sie geho¨rt also auch zu den Mengen, aus deren
Addition erst U entstand, und muß daher ein Teil von U sein:
(1) F ist in U enthalten.
[Marginalie: 19. Vorles. 11. VII.] Ich zeige nun, dass dies zu einem Widerspruch fu¨hrt.
Es seien u1, u2, u3 . . . die Elemente von U ; jedes Element f von F = UU repra¨sentiert
dann eine Belegung von U mit sich selbst, d.h. eine Funktion gewissermaßen, die jedem
Elemente ui von U ein anderes u f (i) zuordnet, wobei die u f (i) keineswegs untereinan-
der verschieden zu sein brauchen; wir stellen dies Element f am besten also durch ein
Schema dar:
f (u1) = u f (1) , f (u2) = u f (2) , f (u3) = u f (3) . . .
Unser Resultat (1), daßF in U enthalten ist, kann man nun na¨her so aussprechen: Man kann
jedemElemente ui vonU eines fi vonF eindeutig zuordnen, so daß alle fi dabei verwendet
werden, eventuell sogar mehrfach, aber immer jedem ui nur genau ein fi entspricht; das
heißt ja offenbar nichts anderes, als daß es “nicht mehr” Elemente fi gibt, als ui . Eine solche
Zuordnung betrachten wir nun: |208
u1| f1, u2| f2, u3| f3 . . . ,
und daraus werde ich eine neue Belegung g von U mit sich selbst bilden, die von allen
fi verschieden ist, also gar nicht in F enthalten wa¨re, da ja bei unserer Zuordnung alle
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Elemente von F zur Verwendung kommen sollten; da aber F alle mo¨glichen Belegungen
entha¨lt, so habenwir hier denWiderspruch.Wirwendenwieder das Princip des Cantorschen
Diagonalverfahrens an. In der Belegung f1 entspreche dem Element u1 dasjenige u f (1)1 :
f1(u1) = u f (1)1 ;
ist ug(1) ein von u f (1)1 verschiedenes Element, so ordnen wir in der neu zu konstruierenden
Belegung g dies dem u1 zu:
g(u1) = ug(1) = u f (1)1 .
Nach diesem Princip verfahren wir weiter; die Bezeichnung der Elemente von U und F
durch Zahlenindices ist u¨brigens unwesentlich und soll nicht etwa andeuten, daß diese
Mengen abza¨hlbar sind, was keineswegs der Fall ist. Ist u2 irgend ein Element von U , so
geho¨rt ihm in der Abbildung von f auf u eine Belegung f2 |209 zu; wir suchen das Element
f2(u2) = u f (2)2 , das sie dem u2 zuordnet, wa¨hlen ug(2) = u f (2)2 und def nieren eine Belegung
g, die dies dem u2 zuordnet:
g(u2) = ug(2) = u f (2)2
Die Belegung g, die wir so erhalten, hat das Schema
g(u1) = ug(1) = u f (1)1 , g(u2) = ug(2) = u f (2)2 , g(u3) = ug(3) = u f (3)3 . . .
Sie unterscheidet sich von jeder Belegung fk aus F in mindestens einer Zuordnung; ist
na¨mlich uk das in der Abbildung von F auf U dem fk entsprechende Element (oder eines
derselben), so ist nach der Def nition von g:
fk(uk) = u f (k)k g(uk) = ug(k) = u f (k)k .
Wir haben damit in der Tat denWiderspruch, daß die wohldef nierte Belegung g nicht in der
Menge aller Belegungen enthalten sein ko¨nnte. Wir ko¨nnten ihn auch dahin formulieren,
daß gema¨ß der letzten Betrachtung die Menge UU stets gro¨ßer [von Hilberts Hand: von
gro¨sserer Ma¨chtigkeit] als U ist, nach der ersten aber in U enthalten. DieserWiderspruch ist
noch keineswegs gekla¨rt; es ist wohl zu sehen, daß er jedenfalls darauf beruhenmuß, daß die
Operationen des Zusammenfassens irgend welcher Mengen, Dinge zu |210 neuen Mengen,
Allheiten doch unerlaubt ist, obwohl es die traditionelle Logik doch stets gebraucht, und
wir es in vorsichtiger Weise stets nur auf ganze Zahlen und daraus entstehende Mengen,
also auf rein mathematisches anwandten.
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